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Abstract
The money-age distribution is hump-shaped for the US post-war economy.
There is no clear cut relation between the variation of money holdings within
generations and age. Furthermore, money is found to be only weakly correlated
with both income and wealth. We analyze three motives for money demand
in an overlapping generations setup in order to explain these observations: 1)
money in the utility, 2) an economy with costly credit service, and 3) limited
participation. All three models are consistent with the hump-shaped relation
between average money holdings and age, yet they predict a much closer asso-
ciation between money holdings, income, wealth, and age than we find in the
data. Only the limited-participation model partly replicates the low bivariate
correlation between money and income as well as between money and interest
bearing assets. None of the three models satisfactorily explains these stylized
facts.
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1 Introduction
The dynamic macroeconomic general equilibrium literature has discussed the distribu-
tion of income and wealth, but has mostly ignored the distribution of money. Dı́az-
Giménez, Quadrini and Rı́os-Rull (1997) document the facts on the U.S. distribution
of earnings, income, and wealth. Earnings and income are much less concentrated
than wealth, and are only weakly correlated with it. Huggett (1996) shows that these
facts can be replicated in a satisfactory manner in an overlapping generations (OLG)
model where agents are characterized by heterogeneous productivity and receive social
security. Huggett and Ventura (2000) also explain the consumption behavior over the
life-cycle and explain why low-income households do not save.
In more recent literature on the modeling of the distribution of assets, attention has also
been directed to housing wealth. In this vein, Coco (2005) and Nakijama (2005) study
the life-cycle distribution of housing wealth. To the best of our knowledge, however,
there is no comparable study available for the life-cycle distribution of money.
In this paper, we address this issue. We use empirical evidence from the United States
to document the following stylized facts:
1. money holdings are hump-shaped over the life-cycle,
2. there is no clear-cut relation between the variation of money holdings and age,
3. income, wealth, and age explain only a small fraction of the variation of money
holdings.
In addition, this empirical evidence is found to be stable through the past two decades.
We develop three alternative widely-used monetary general equilibrium models to ex-
plain the heterogeneity of money holdings across individuals. They differ in the way
money is introduced. We compare the following approaches:
1. Money in the utility function, in which households save in the form of money or
capital.
2. Costly credit, in which households consume a continuum of commodities that
can be purchased with either money or credit. Credit, however, is costly, as in
Dotsey and Ireland (1996). Money is a poor store of value since it is dominated
in return by capital.
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3. Limited participation, in which firms need to finance wage expenditures with a
loan, while households deposit part of their money at a bank. The central bank
injects the money into the banking sector after the households have made the
deposits, but before the firms ask for a loan.




















and limited participation frameworks are widely used by empirical researchers involved
in medium-term macroeconomic policy analysis. For this reason, we believe it is im-
portant to evaluate the properties of the stationary distributions of these widely-used
models. Berensten (2002) has shown that in search theoretic models, in the tradition of
Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), any initial distribution of the optimal quantity of money
holdings, if production costs are no too high, converges asymptotically to a uniform
distribution.
The models we use are of course very different from the search-theoretic approach. We
find that all three popular models explain the hump-shaped pattern between average
money holdings and age but fail to produce the low predictive power of income, wealth,
and age for the distribution of money holdings. The limited-participation model, how-
ever, can account for the low bivariate correlations between income and money and
between money and household’s holdings of interest-bearing assets. Therefore, our
results suggest that a cash-in-advance constraint should be specified so that the house-
holds can use wage income in order to finance consumption.
Section 2 documents the empirical facts of the money-age distribution for the US
economy. Section 3 introduces the overlapping-generations model with two assets,
money and capital. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the
US economy in Section 4. Our numerical results are presented in Section 5, followed
by the conclusion.1
2 Empirical Observations
We use data from the 1994, 1999, 2001, and 2005 University of Michigan Personal
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) family, income, and wealth files. These are the
only four data sets for which we are able to match data on income, age, money and
1Appendix 1 covers additional empirical evidence. Appendix 2 performs a sensitivity analysis with
regard to our calibration. A more detailed technical explanation of the solution methods for each of
the models appears in a Technical Appendix that is available upon request from the authors.
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capital.2 Our data set includes families with strictly positive money holdings where
the head of household is of age between 20 and 80. This gives us 21,574 observations.3
To analyze the money holding behavior depending on age, we group the households
in the following age categories: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59,
60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-80. Money, M , is defined as money in checking or savings
accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings bonds, and
treasury bills.4 Capital, K, consists of shares of stock in publicly held corporations,
k durch K
ersetztmutual funds, and investment funds and other savings or assets, such as bond funds
and life insurance policies. Total family income is made of taxable and transfer income
of head, wife, and other family unit members and Social Security Income. In addition
to the PSID data we use data for income, earnings, and wealth from the Survey of
Consumer Finances 1992.









ure 2.2 pictures the distribution of money balances over the life-cycle. Table 2.1 shows
empirical correlations between money/income, money/capital, and capital/income for
1994, 1999, 2001, and 2005, represented by ρ(M,Y ), ρ(M,K), and ρ(Y,K), while Table









Year ρ(M,Y ) ρ(M,W ) ρ(Y,W )
1994 .21 .18 .21
1999 .20 .28 .12
2001 .26 .29 .11
2005 .29 .07 .04
Notes: to be added
The behavior of money/net worth ratio in Table 2.2 is worth noting. We see that
the ratio jumped in 2004, as asset holders transferred their wealth out of stocks into
shorter-term more liquid assets.
2For this reason we do not control for cohort effects in the computation of the inequality of money
holdings as is done by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004).
3While data on household consumption would be desirable, the PSID survey only includes expen-
diture on food consumption.
4This definition of money in the PSID data does not strictly match the definition of money as a
purely non-interest bearing asset as it appears in our models. The PSID wealth files do not make this
distinction in money holdings of households.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Income, Earnings, Money and Wealth
Table 2.3 contains fixed-effects panel regressions of money holdings M on income Y ,
wealth W , and age T , as well as the square values of these variables. The symbol R2
is the multiple correlation coefficient, while the values in parentheses are the robust
t-ratios. The coefficient estimates in the first row use capital as the indicator of wealth,
while the coefficients appearing in the third row use total wealth less money holdings as
the indicator of household wealth. Capital in the first regression is defined as household-
owned shares of stocks in publicly held corporations, mutual funds or investment trusts,
not including stocks in employer-based pensions or individual retirement accounts. We
Table 2.2
Money/Net Worth Ratios
Year 1994 1999 2001 2005
Mean .30 .21 .21 .73
Std.Dev 1.63 .94 .98 2.88
Notes: to be added
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Figure 2.2: Money Balances over the Life Cycle
see that the results are quite robust to either definition of wealth.
We observe the following regularities:5
1. Money is much more concentrated than income or earnings and almost as un-
equally distributed as wealth, as shown in Figure 2.1.
2. Money M is only weakly correlated with income and capital.
3. Money holdings increase steadily over most of the life-cycle and only decrease at
ages 75-80 so that a hump-shaped pattern emerges.
4. The standard deviation of money is hump-shaped as well. See the upper right
panel in Figure 2.2.
5. The dispersion as measured by the coefficient of variation of money holdings has
no obvious relation to age. See the lower left panel in Figure 2.2.
5The Appendix in Section 7 demonstrates that most of the findings reported below are not a feature
of pooling but also emerge in the individual data sets.
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Table 2.3
Regressions of Money on Income, Wealth and Age
Argument: Y Y 2 W W 2 T T 2 R2
Coeff: 0.32 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -1.66 0.02 .14
(6.72) (-5.72) (1.27) (2.64) (-4.58) (6.06)
Coeff: 0.33 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -1.67 0.03 .12
(6.16) (-5.16) (0.38) (1.82) (-4.58) (5.99)
Notes: to be added
6. When we regress money on income, income squared, capital, capital squared, age,
and age squared, we find that money holdings increase with income (this relation
is significantly hump-shaped) and decrease with age (this relation is u-shaped).
This also holds, when we use total family wealth less money holdings as our




a small share of the variation of money holdings over income and age groups.6
3 The Model
As mentioned above, we use a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with
three different frameworks for money demand: the use of money as an argument in
the household utility function, the device of differentiating cash and credit goods, and
limited participation by households in the financial system (restricting their savings to
deposits in the banking system).
Four sectors appear in the model: households, production, banking, and the govern-
ment. Households maximize discounted life-time utility. Agents can save either with
money or with capital. Individuals are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity
and cannot insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Firms maximize profits. Output is
produced with the help of labor and capital. The government collects taxes from labor
and interest income in order to finance its expenditures on government consumption.
The government also provides social security and controls the money supply. In the
limited-participation model, banks receive deposits from households and lend them to
firms. We restrict our analysis to steady-state behavior. For simplicity of notation we
drop the time indices of our variables whenever appropriate.
6We also included the number of children in each household in the regressions but this variable
was insignificant in the fixed effect method as well as year-by-year estimation.
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3.1 Households
Every year a generation of equal measure is born. The total measure of all generations
is normalized to one. As we only study steady-state behavior, we concentrate on the
behavior of an individual h born in period 0. The first period of life is period s = 1. We
use s to refer to the age of agent h. The total measure of all households is normalized
to one.
Households live a maximum of T years. Lifetime is stochastic and agents face a proba-
bility ϕs of surviving up to age s conditional on surviving up to age s−1. During their
first R−1 years, agents supply one unit of labor inelastically. After R years, retirement
is mandatory. Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their labor earnings. Labor
earnings e(s, zh)w are stochastic and depend on individual age s, idiosyncratic labor
productivity zh, and the wage rate w. After retirement, households receive pensions
b(ēh) which depend on the average lifetime earnings ēh of the individual h. Further-
more, agents hold two kinds of assets, real money m = M/P and capital k, where
M and P denote nominal money and the price level, respectively. The household h is
born without any capital: kh1 ≡ 0. In the money-in the utility function model, the first
generation is endowed with a strictly positive amount of nominal money, Mh1 = M̄h0.
7
Capital or, equally, equity k earns a real interest rate r. Parents do not leave altruistic
bequests to their children. All accidental bequests are confiscated by the state.










where β denotes the discount factor.
In our first case, we simply consider money in the utility function:





where c, m, and σ > 0 denote consumption, real-money balances, and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, respectively.8
In our second specification, consumers can purchase consumption with cash or credit
as in Schreft (1992), Gillman (1993), or Dotsey and Ireland (1996). The consump-
tion goods are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and the consumption aggregate is given by
7Otherwise, the level of utility at age 1 is not well-defined. The calibration of M̄h0 is discussed in
Section 4.
8We also considered a CES-index in consumption and real money balances, but found the results
not superior to those implied by the Cobb-Douglas case considered in equation (3.2).
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c = inf i{c(i)}. Therefore, the individuals will consume the same amount of all goods
as in Schreft (1992). Utility u(·) is of the form




In order to buy an amount c of good i with credit, the household must purchase κ(i)
units of financial services. The function κ(i) is strictly increasing in i, and satisfies
limi→1 κ(i) = ∞. According to the latter assumption, some goods will be purchased
with cash, and the demand for money is well defined. In particular, we follow Dotsey







According to this specification transactions costs are independent of the level of con-
sumption c(i) so that households with high consumption have relatively low transaction
costs and will buy more goods with the help of credit than households with low con-
sumption.
Intermediation of credit services is subject to perfect competition, and in order to
produce one unit of service one efficiency unit of labor is used. In equilibrium, the
financial service companies make zero profit, and the fees per unit of financial service
sold is equal to the wage rate w.
The household of age s and type h will purchase a fraction ζhs ∈ [0, 1) of consumption
goods with credit and faces the following cash-in-advance constraint on the remaining
purchases:
case 2: chs(1− ζhs) ≤ mhs. (3.5)
In the third specification, households deposit part of the financial wealth at banks at
the gross nominal interest Q. The firms pay wages to the households before they sell
their output. To finance the wage bill, firms borrow money from the banking sector.
The government injects the money into the banking sector. Crucially, banks receive the
monetary transfer after households have made their deposits in the banking system.
Households hold nominal financial wealth Mhs = Dhs +Xhs where Dhs is the amount
deposited at banks and Xhs are money balances kept for the purchase of consumption
goods. Since households receive wages before they go shopping, their cash-in-advance
constraint is
chs ≤
xhs + (1− τw − θ)wte(s, zh) s < R,xhs + b(ēhs), s ≥ R. (3.6)
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where xhs := Xhs/P , τw, and θ denote real money balances, labor income taxes, and
social security contributions, respectively. Furthermore, cash holdings cannot be neg-
ative, xhs ≥ 0.
The s-year old agent h receives income from capital khs and labor e(s, zh)w in each
period s of his life. After retirement agents do not work, e(s, zh) = 0 for s ≥ R. The
real budget constraint of the s-year old household h is given by:9
(1− τr)rkhs + (1− τw − θ)we(s, zh) + b(ēhs) + tr + khs +mhs (3.7)
=





κ(c, i) di + khs+1 + πmhs+1 − Seign case 2
chs − (1− τr)(Q− 1)dhs + ΩB + khs+1 + πmhs+1 case 3
where Seign and π = Pt/Pt−1 denote seigniorage and the inflation factor between two
successive periods t− 1 and t, respectively.
Note that in the stationary equilibrium π is a constant and equals the money growth
factor. In cases 1 and 2, households receive the seigniorage. In the limited participation
model, the central bank injects the increase in the money supply into the banking
sector, while households receive lump-sum profits from banks, ΩB, and earn interest
Q− 1 on their real deposits dhs. Real interest income is taxed at the rate τr.
In addition, the households receive transfers tr from the government. Social security
benefits b(s, ēh) depend on the agent’s age s as well as on an average of past earnings
ēh of the household h. Following Huggett and Ventura (2000), social security benefits
are composed of a lump-sum component and an earnings-related benefit:
b(s, ēh) =
0 s < R
b0 + b1(ēhs) s ≥ R
(3.8)
The function b1(ēhs) is described in more detail in Section 4.
3.2 Production
Firms are of measure one and produce output with effective labor N and capital K.
Effective labor N is paid the wage w. In the case of the limited participation model,
firms have to pay workers in advance and have to borrow wN at the nominal interest
rate Q−1 in advance. Capital K is hired at rate r and depreciates at rate δ. Production
Y is characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
Y = F (K,N) = KαN1−α. (3.9)




In a factor market equilibrium, factors are rewarded with their marginal product:
(1− α)KαN−α =
w cases 1 and 2Qw case 3 (3.10)
αKα−1N1−α − δ = r. (3.11)
Consequently, profits are zero.
3.3 Banking Sector
In the limited participation model we also model a banking sector. At the beginning
of period t banks receive deposits of size Dt from households. Government transfers
the amount Mt+1 −Mt to the banks that are able to lend Dt +Mt+1 −Mt to firms.
At the end of the period t they pay interest and principal QDt to their creditors and
distribute the remaining real profits ΩB to the households:
ΩBt =














The government consists of the fiscal and monetary authority. Nominal money grows




In cases 1 and 2, seigniorage Seign = µM/P is transferred lump-sum. In case 3, money
is injected into the banking sector.
The government uses the revenues from taxing income and aggregate accidental be-
quests Beq in order to finance its expenditures on government consumption G, gov-
ernment transfers tr, and transfers to the one-year old households m̃:10
G+ tr + m̃ =
τrrk + τwN + Beq + Seign cases 1 and 2τrrk + τwN + Beq case 3 (3.15)
10Following Heer and Süssmuth (2007), we assume that in case 1 the first-period money balances
are financed by the government.
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We assume that transfers tr are distributed lump-sum to all households. Furthermore,
the government provides social security benefits Pens that are financed by taxes on
labor income:
Pens = θwN. (3.16)
3.5 Stationary Equilibrium
The concept of equilibrium applied in this paper uses a recursive representation of the
consumer’s problem following Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). Let φs(k,m, d, ē, z)
and Vs(k,m, d, ē, z) denote the measure and the value of the objective function of
the s-year old agent with equity k, real money m, deposits d, average earnings ē, and
idiosyncratic productivity level z, respectively. Vs(k,m, d, ē, z) is defined as the solution
to the dynamic program:
Vs(k,m, d, ē, z) = max
k′,m′,d′,c
{u+ βϕs+1E [Vs+1(k′,m′, d′, ē′, z′)]} (3.17)
subject to (3.7), (3.5) and (3.7), (3.6) and (3.7) in cases 1, 2, and 3, respectively. k′, m′,
d′, ē′, and z′ denote the next-period value of k, m, d, ē, and z, respectively. Optimal
decision rules at age s are functions of k,m, d, ē, and z, i.e. consumption cs(k,m, d, ē, z),
next period deposits ds+1(k,m, d, ē, z), next-period capital stock ks+1(k,m, d, ē, z), and
next-period real money balances ms+1(k,m, d, ē, z). In cases 1 and 2, deposits are zero,
d ≡ 0. In case 2, the optimal share of cash goods also depends on the individual state
variables, ζs = ζs(k,m, ē, z).
We will consider a stationary equilibrium where factor prices, aggregate capital, and
labor are constant and the distribution of wealth is stationary.
Definition
A stationary equilibrium for a given government policy {τr, τw, θ, G, tr, b(·), µ} is a
collection of value functions Vs(k,m, d, ē, z), individual policy rules cs(k,m, d, ē, z), k
′ =
ks+1(k,m, d, ē, z), m
′ = ms+1(k,m, d, ē, z), d
′ = ds+1(k,m, d, ē, z), and ζ(k,m, ē, z),
relative prices of labor and capital {w, r}, and distributions (φ1(.), . . . , φT (.)), such
that:
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(1− ϕs+1) as+1(k,m, d, ē, z)φs(k,m, d, ē, z)dz
























m φ1(0,m, 0, ē, z) dz dē dm,
where as+1(k,m, d, ē, z) ≡ ks+1(k,m, d, ē, z)+ms+1(k,m, d, ē, z)+ds+1(k,m, d, ē, z).
2. Relative prices {w, r} solve the firm’s optimization problem by satisfying (3.11)
and (3.10).
3. Given relative prices {w, r} and government policy {τr, τw, θ, b(.), G, tr, µ}, indi-
vidual policy rules cs(·), ks+1(·), ms+1(·), and ds+1(·) solve the consumer’s dy-
namic program (3.17).
4. The government budget (3.15) is balanced.
5. Social security benefits equal taxes:













b(ē, j)φs(k,m, d, ē, z) dz dē dd dm dk.
(3.18)
6. Money grows at the exogenous rate µ.
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7. The goods market clears:
KαN1−α = C +G+ δK + TC. (3.19)














wκ (cs(k,m, ē, z), i) di
)
φs(k,m, ē, z) dz dē dm dk. (3.20)
4 Calibration
Periods correspond to years. We assume that agents are born at the real lifetime age
20 which corresponds to s = 1. Agents work R− 1 = 40 years corresponding to a real
lifetime age of 60. They live a maximum life of 60 years (T = 60) so that agents do
not become older than the real lifetime age 79. The sequence of conditional survival
probabilities {ϕs}59s=1 is set in accordance with the age-specific death rates in the US
in the year 2000. The data is taken from the United States Life Tables 2000 provided
by the National Center of Health.11 The survival probabilities almost monotonously
decrease with age. For the final period of our model, we set the survival probability
ϕ60 equal to zero.
Our numerical specification appears in Table 4.1. The calibration of the production
parameters α and δ and the Markov process e(s, zh) is chosen in accordance with
existing general equilibrium studies: Following Prescott (1986), the capital income
share α is set equal to 0.36. The annual rate of depreciation is set at δ = 0.08.
Earnings are the product of real wage per efficiency unit times the labor endowment
e(s, zh). The labor endowment process is given by e(s, zh) = e
zh+ȳs , where ȳs is the
mean lognormal income of the s-year old. The mean efficiency index ȳs of the s-year-
old worker is taken from Hansen (1993) and interpolated to in-between years. As a
consequence, we are able to replicate the cross-section age distribution of earnings of
the US economy. We also normalize the average efficiency index to one. The age-
productivity profile is hump-shaped and earnings peak at age 50. Agents differ in log
labor endowments at birth and there is no income mobility within an age cohort so
that zh is constant for all s = 1, . . . , R − 1. We follow Huggett (1996) and choose a
lognormal distribution of earnings for the 20-year old with σy1 = 0.38 and mean ȳ1. As
the log endowment of the initial generation of agents is normally distributed, the log
11See Table 1 in Arias (2002).
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efficiency of subsequent agents will continue to be normally distributed. This is a useful
property of the earnings process, which has often been described as lognormal in the
literature. With our earnings specification, we come close to the earnings heterogeneity
that is observed in US data. Henle and Ryscavage (1980) compute an earnings Gini
coefficient for men of 0.42 in the period 1958-77. In our model the Gini coefficient is
0.36.
The social security payment b(s, ēh) is calibrated and parameterized in order to match
the US Social Security System and exactly follows Huggett and Ventura (2000).12
Average earnings ēs,t of the s-year old in period t accumulate according to:
ēs,t =
{
(ēs−1,t−1(j − 1) + min {e(s, zht)wt, emax}) /j for s < R− 1
ēs−1,t−1 for s ≥ R− 1
(4.1)
We note that in the US benefits depend on mean earnings that are indexed so that
later contributions in life are not discounted. Furthermore, average earnings are only
calculated for up to some maximum earnings level emax which amounts to 2.47 times
average earnings Ē.13
Following Huggett and Ventura, we set the lump-sum benefit b0 equal to 12.42% of GDP
per capita in the model economy. Finally, benefits are regressive and a concave function
of average earnings. Let ēh and Ē denote the average earnings of individual h and the
average earnings of all workers, respectively. Depending on which earnings bracket the
retired agent’s average earnings ēh were situated, he received 90% of the first 20% · Ē,
32% of the next 104% of Ē, and 15% of the remaining earnings (ēh − 1.24Ē) in 1994.
Therefore, the marginal benefit rate declines with average earnings. The social security
contribution rate θ is calibrated so that the budget of the social security balances. The
remaining parameters of the government policy that we need to calibrate are the two
tax rates τr and τw and government expenditures G. The two tax rates τr = 42.9%
and τw = 24.8% are computed as the average values of the effective US tax rates over
the time period 1965-88 that are reported by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The
share of government consumption in GDP is G/Y = 19.5%, which is equal to the
average ratio of G/Y in the US during 1959-93 according to the Economic Report of
the President (1994). The model parameters are presented in Table 4.1.
We choose the coefficient of risk aversion σ = 2.14 The discount factor β = 1.011 is set
12For a more detailed description of this procedure please see Huggett and Ventura (2000).
13In the US Social Security System, only the 35 highest earnings payments are considered in the
calculation of the average earnings. We simplify the analysis by using all 40 working years in our
model.
14All our qualitative results also hold for the case σ ∈ {1, 4}.
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equal to the estimate of Hurd (1989).15 In case 1, the remaining parameter γ from the
utility function is chosen to match the average velocity of money PY/M . During 1960-
2001, the average annual velocity of M1 amounted to 6.0, while the average inflation
rate was equal to 4.32%. We set γ = 0.9787 implying a velocity of money in our
benchmark model without productivity mobility equal to 6.0 (for π = 4.32%). The
initial endowment with money is chosen so that M̄h0/Pt is close to M̄h2/Pt, the optimal
stock of money accumulated by the s = 1 year old households for their next period of
life s = 2. In case 2, we follow Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and choose κ0 and χ to match
two statistics: the share of cash goods in total consumption expenditures and the semi
interest rate elasticity of money demand. In particular, the stationary equilibrium of
our model replicates a share of cash goods of 0.82 found by Avery et al. (1987) for
the US in 1984 and the semi interest rate elasticity computed as in Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), p. 38, equals 5.95 percent, which is the estimate of these authors from US data
between 1959 and 1991. The computation of the model is described in the Appendix
that is available from the authors upon request.
5 Findings
Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 display the age profile of assets (capital and money balances),
consumption, and gross income generated by the money in the utility function model
(MIUF for further reference), the costly credit model (CC), and the limited participa-
tion model (LP).
The consumption smoothing behavior is clearly discernible and common to all three
models. Irrespective of the level of income – as governed by the exogenously specified
time paths of productivity – the time path of consumption is hump-shaped, despite
the sudden decline of gross income taking place at the age of retirement (see the lower
left and lower right panels of Figures 5.1 through 5.3). Corresponding to the time path
of consumption is the hump-shaped time path of interest bearing assets (capital in
the MIUF and CC models, capital and bank deposits in the LP model) for the richer
households (j = 3, 4, 5).
The upper right panels of Figures 5.1-5.3 reveal the consequences of the different mo-
tives to store money on the time profile of real money holdings. In the MIUF model,
real money holdings are proportional to consumption and, thus, their time profile is
also humped-shaped.
15Appendix 2 performs a sensitivity analysis for β = 0.99.
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Table 4.1
Calibration of Parameters for the U.S. Economy
Description Function/Parameter Parameter Value
Utility Function u =
(cγm1−γ)
1−σ
1−σ σ = 2.0
γ = .9787 (case 1)
γ = 1 (cases 2,3)
Discount Rate β β = 1.011
Production Y = KαN1−α. α = .36






. κ0= .1428, χ = .1587
Money Growth µ µ = .0432
Income Tax τr, τw τr= .429, τw= .248
Government G G/Y = .195
Social Security:
Max Earnings emax emax= .2.47E
Lump Sum Benefit b0 b0= .1241Y
b1(ϵ) Earning bracket Marginal benefit
[0..2E] .90
[.2E, 1.24E] .32
[1.24E< e < emax] .15
Notes: to be added
In the CC model this only holds for the poorer households j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, since there
are two opposing effects. For a given share of credit goods ζhs, the cash in advance
constraint implies that real money balances mimic the age-profile of consumption and,
thus, also display a humped-shaped pattern. However, as credit costs per unit of
consumption decline with consumption, the share of credit goods increases so that less
money is needed to facilitate a given level of consumption. This can be seen in Figure






hardly discernible in the plot. For the very rich households j = 5 the second effect
dominates almost from the beginning of their life and real money balances decline with
age. For the poorer households j ∈ {1, 2, 3} this effect never dominates.
In the LP model the time profile of cash balances is the mirror image of the time profile
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Figure 5.1: Assets, Consumption, and Gross Income in the MIUF Model
of gross income.16 Households face a cash-in-advance constraint and can use money and
labor income (or labor replacement income) in order to purchase consumption goods.
At the age of retirement, labor income falls for all agents as pensions are much lower
than labor income. The decline in labor income, however, is more pronounced for the
high-income households because pensions also contain a considerable lump-sum com-
ponent. In order to sustain consumption, especially the rich households must build up
considerable cash balances at the age of retirement. On the other hand, the households
with high productivity do not hold any cash balances at young age at all. Households
that receive high wage income at young age save part of this income. The cash-in-
advance constraint does not bind for this group in their youth, and, consequently, they
do not hold any cash balances.
Table 5.1 presents the correlations between money holdings, gross income, and interest
bearing assets implied by the three different models. The LP model comes close to
16Notice that we consider cash balances x rather than money balances m = x+ d in the LP model.
In this model, the deposit holdings d of the individual households are indeterminate because, in
equilibrium, the households are indifferent between the holdings of the two interest-bearing assets,
deposits d and capital k.
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Figure 5.2: Assets, Consumption and Gross Income in the CC Model
reproduce the low correlation between income and money as well as between money
and interest bearing assets found in the data.
In our three models, the households with the highest income (wealth) are the high-
productivity agents at age s between 30 and 40 just prior to retirement (35 and 45
just prior and after retirement). As can be seen from Figure 5.6, these households
with the highest income almost hold no cash in the LP model which reduces the
correlation of income and money almost to zero (0.09) while we observe empirical
correlations between 0.20-0.29. The strong correlation of money and wealth that we
observe in the MIUF case (0.84) is also not present in the LP model (0.43) and is
in much better accordance with empirical observations (0.07-0.29). Not only do the
wealth-rich households (those with high productivity) at age 30-40 hold little cash, but
also do the wealth poor households (those aged 50 and above) hold relatively large
cash balances in the LP model. In the CC model, the rich households use credit rather
than cash to finance consumption so that the money income correlation is also much
lower, even though to a smaller extent than in the LP model. In addition, the model
implies a correlation between money and capital stocks that is in line with the empirical
19
Figure 5.3: Assets, Consumption and Gross Income in the LP Model
correlations reported in Table 2.1. Yet, all three models predicts a much too strong
association between gross income and interest bearing assets.
Figures 5.4-5.6 shed light on the intra-generational distribution of money holdings.
With respect to average money holdings the MIUF and the LP model predict the hump-
shaped profile found in the data while the CC model comes close to that pattern. The
CC and the LP model imply no clear cut relation between the variational coefficient
of money holdings and age, similar to the one observed in the PSID data sets for the
years 1999, 2001, and 2005.
Table 5.2 pictures regression results with the model data, again with robust t-ratios
in parentheses below each of the coefficients. The overall association between money
holdings, gross income, interest bearing assets, and age predicted by our three models
is much stronger than we observe for US households. The multiple correlation coeffi-
cient R2 obtained from all three models is four to five times larger than the empirical






observed signs of the coefficients of income. The MIUF model also predicts the correct
signs of the coefficients of age.
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Table 5.1
Correlations Implied by Simulated Models
Year ρ(M,Y ) ρ(M,W ) ρ(Y,W )
MIUF .67 .84 .77
CC .42 .29 .76
LP .09 .43 .83
Notes: to be added
Table 5.2
Regression Results with Simulated Data
Arg: cons Y Y 2 W W 2 T T 2 R2
MIUF 0.15 0.10 -.01 0.03 -.00 -0.02 0.00 .88
(6.64) (7.77) (-8.84) (8.81) (-4.69) (-8.20) (8.71)
CC -.15 0.58 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 .71
(3.61) (24.04) (-25.83) (-3.93) (0.06) (4.52) (1.25)
LP 0.29 0.13 -0.07 0.11 -0.00 -.0.05 -0.00 .75
(3.53) (1.84) (-9.88) (5.47) (-1.31) (-7.30) (-2.06)
Notes: to be added
We offer two different explanations for this result. First, we might have neglected
further characteristics besides age, income and capital in our model that help to explain
the correlation of wealth and money. For example, we do not model housing. Second,
due to the lack of data, we had to include assets like T-Bills in our empirical measure
of money. In old age, agents might decumulate their savings in the form of shares and
investment funds in order to switch their asset holdings to the relatively safe asset in
the form of T-Bills.17
6 Conclusion
When we extend the infinitely-lived representative-agent framework with the money-
in-the-utility, costly credit or limited participation models, we encounter many counter-
factual implications for the money-age and cross-sectional money distribution. None of
17Campbell et al. (2001) derive this kind of optimal portfolio allocation on stocks and bonds over
the life-cycle in an OLG model.
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Figure 5.4: Distribution of Money in the MIUF Model
these models can reconcile their implications with empirical facts about the dispersion
of money holdings as well as with cross-section correlations of money with income and
wealth.
We conclude that our knowledge of the cross-section distribution of money is limited.
Newer approaches are needed to explain the dispersion of money holdings over the life-
cycle. One possible promising avenue of future research is the consideration of both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. In a life-cycle model without money, Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2007) show that non-tradable idiosyncratic risk has a substantial
effect on asst market risk premiums and on the portfolio composition over the life-cycle
holdings. In order to introduce aggregate risk and to model its effect on the risk-return
properties of money adequately, nominal frictions have to be considered as well in our
general-equilibrium model. An example for such a kind of a life-cycle model is Heer
and Maußner (2011) who analyze the redistributive effects of unanticipated inflation
in response to both a technology and a monetary shock. To extend their model by
idiosyncratic income risk is likely to help us to better understand the money-holdings
of individuals over the life-cycle.
22
Figure 5.5: Distribution of Money in the CC Model
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7 Appendix 1
In Appendix 1, we provide further empirical evidence on the individual data sets.
7.1 Analysis of the PSID Data Sets: 1994, 1999, 2001, and 2005
Figures 7.1 through 7.4 display the relation between money holdings and age. The
smooth curves are cubic polynomials fitted to the data to highlight possible trends.
Figure 7.1: Money Balances over the Life Cycle, 1994
Table 7.1 contains the regression results using the individual data sets for each year,
with robust t-ratios in parentheses.
8 Appendix 2: Sensitivity Analysis
β = 0.99
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Figure 7.2: Money Balances over the Life Cycle, 1999
9 Appendix 3 (not for publication)
In Appendix 2 we provide more technical details on the solution and computational
strategy we used to obtain our results.
9.1 Individual Productivity and Aggregate Labor
Let ȳs denote the mean efficiency index of the s-year old worker. We approximate the
productivity distribution among the members of generation s = 1 by the distribution
of earnings for the 20-year old used by Huggett (1996). We discretize his distribution
at l = 5 points yh1, h = 1, 2, . . . , l. Since there is no income mobility, we are able to
index households with the index h. Thus, the productivity of household h at age s is
given by eszh, where es = e
ȳs and zh = e
yh1 . Let ψs denote the mass of generation s.
We normalize the total mass of all generations to one,
∑T
s=1 ψs ≡ 1. Note that
ψs+1 = ϕsψs.
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Figure 7.3: Money Balances over the Life Cycle, 2001
We use νh,
∑l
h=1 νh ≡ 1 to denote the mass of households with productivity zh. Since
individual labor supply is exogenous and equal to nhs = 1 for all h = 1, . . . , l and







Given the aggregate wage rate w, which is a constant in the stationary equilibrium of
the model, we are able to compute the social security benefits of retired households.
These benefits depend on the household’s productivity parameter zh but not on his
age:
bhs =
0 for s = 1, 2, . . . , R − 1,b̄h > 0 for s = R,R + 1, . . . , T. (9.2)











Figure 7.4: Money Balances over the Life Cycle, 2005
9.2 Money in the Utility Function
9.2.1 First order conditions
In the stationary solution the wage rate w, the real interest rate r, the inflation factor
π = 1 + µ, household labor supply n ≡ 1, government transfers tr, and social security
payments b̄h are independent of calendar time and exogenously given to household
h ∈ {1, 2, . . . l}. Since transfers are distributed lump sum and since the mass of all
agents is one, aggregate equal individual transfers. The Lagrangian of the household’s
29
Table 7.1
Regression of Money with PSID Data
Argument: cons Y Y 2 W W 2 T T 2 R2
1994 10.84 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.91 0.02 .13
T-Ratio (1.37) (3.24) (-0.88) (5.54) (-4.35) (-2.31) (3.75)
1999 34.05 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.00 -2.61 0.03 .12
T-Ratio (2.90) (3.15) (-3.77) (1.09) (-0.04) (-2.92) (3.30)
2001 23.13 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 -.2.02 0.03 .14
T-Ratio (2.83) (4.68) (-0.60) (-0.36) (1.91) (-3.50) (4.05)
2005 11.29 0.41 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -1.55 0.02 .28
T-Ratio (1.48) (5.70) (-4.99) (-2.25) (2.63) (-2.91) (3.78)
Notes: to be added






















 (1− τw − θ)weszh+(1− (1− τr)r)khs + Seign









 b̄h + (1− (1− τr)r)khs+tr +mhs + Seign
−chs − πmhs+1 − khs+1
 ,
where λhs denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint effective at age s.







































)  = 0 (9.7)
















(1 + (1− τr)r) (9.9)
chs = (1− τw − θ)weszh + bhs + (1 + (1− τr)r)khs (9.10)
+ tr +mhs + Seign− πmhs+1 − khs+1
They form a system in 2(T −1)+T equations in the unknowns chs, s = 1, . . . , T , khs+1,
and mhs+1, s = 1, . . . , T − 1.
9.2.2 Computational strategy
Suppose we are given individual capital stocks k0hs and real money holdings m
0
hs, h =
1, 2, . . . , l, s = 2, . . . , T as well as money transfers from the government to the newborn
mh1, h = 1, . . . , l. We compute new values in the following steps:







This allows us to compute the average wage rate w and the real interest rate r via
equations (3.10) and (3.11). Furthermore, aggregate output is
Y = N1−αKα, (9.12)
so that government’s purchases of goods equal G = 0.195Y .
Step 2: Given w, equation (9.3) delivers θ and equations (4.1) imply b̄h.
Step 3: We compute government transfers. Before we are able to do so, we need to







νh(khs+1 + πmhs+1), (9.13)
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and the former by






Thus, the government’s budget constraint implies




Step 4: Given this information we can solve equations (??) for new values of khs+1 and
mhs+1. The fixed point of this mapping is the solution to our model.
We supply starting values for a non-linear equations solver from a simpler model with-
out money. The individual capital stocks in this model can be found from solving a
system of linear equations. We use individual consumption implied by this solution
and equation (9.8) to compute mh1 and to initialize mhs+1.
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9.3 Costly Credit
9.3.1 First order conditions










The derivation of this function with respect to ζhs is:






It is obvious from the specification of (9.16) that the agent will never choose ζhs = 1.
Therefore, we only need to consider the case ζhs ∈ [0, 1). The Lagrangian of the
18Techniques to solve overlapping generations models are discussed in more detail in Heer and

































b̄h + (1 + (1− τr)r)khs
+tr +mhs+
Seign− TChs(ζhs)








ϕj [Γhs (mhs − (1− ζhs)chs) + Ψhsζhs] ,
(9.18)
where Γhs and Ψhs denote the Lagrange multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint
and the non-negativity constraint on ζhs, respectively.











Therefore, if 0 < ζhs < 1, λhsTC
′
















c−σhs = λhs + (1− ζhs)Γhs. (9.21)
The first-order condition with respect to khs+1 implies
λhs = βϕs+1λhs+1(1 + (1− τr)r), (9.22)
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ϕj [−πλhs + βϕs+1 (λhs+1 + Γhs+1)] = 0, (9.23)
which implies
λhs = (β/π)ϕs+1(λhs+1 + Γhs+1). (9.24)
Combining (9.22) and (9.24) gives the following expression:




Since the nominal interest factor Q is constant in the stationary solution this also
implies
Γhs = (Q− 1)λhs, s = 1, 2, . . . , T. (9.26)
Furthermore, if Q > 1 the cash-in-advance constraint binds for all s = 1, 2, . . . , T . This
allows us to write the following:
mhs = (1− ζhs)chs. (9.27)
(9.21) and (9.26) can be combined to yield
c−σhs = λhs(1 + (1− ζhs)(Q− 1)). (9.28)
Substituting for Γhs in (??) from (9.26) in turn yields
TC ′hs(ζhs) = (Q− 1)chs. (9.29)
In addition to (9.27), (9.28), and (9.29), the budget constraint must be satisfied:
chs = (1− τw − θ)eszhw + bhs
+ (1 + (1− τr)r)khs +mhs + tr + Seign
− TChs(ζhs)− khs+1 − πmhs+1.
(9.30)
9.3.2 Computational strategy
Suppose we have initial values for the households’ stock of capital khs, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
s = 2, 3, . . . , T and consumption chs, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m, s = 1, 2, . . . , T . Our purpose is
to set up a non-linear system of equations that can be solved numerically.
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Step 1: This step is equivalent to Step 1 in the MIUF model. In addition to the
variables computed there, we solve for Q from
Q = π(1 + (1− τr)r).









Given this solution we can compute
mhs = (1− ζhs)chs. (9.32)
Step 3: Since we now know mhs we are able to compute seigniorage and aggregate
bequests. From these magnitudes we derive the transfer payments via (9.15).
Step 4: We compute individual consumption from the agents’ budget constraints and
subtract the result from the given initial chs. This supplies mT equations in the un-
known consumption vector. In doing so we use Gauss-Chebyshev integration to com-
pute TChs.








1 + (1− ζhs+1)(Q− 1)







βϕs+1(1 + (1− τr)r)
we get:






1 + (1− ζhs+1)(Q− 1)
1 + (1− ζhs)(Q− 1)
. (9.34)
As starting values for consumption and capital we use the solution of the same model




Money supply Mt grows at the constant rate µ. In the stationary equilibrium the price
level Pt evolves according to Pt+1/Pt = π = 1 + µ. Let Qt denote the nominal interest
factor, wtNt the aggregate real wage bill, Dt the nominal aggregate amount of bank
deposits and Xt the nominal aggregate level of money holdings. Total nominal lending
of banks to firms is Dt + (π − 1)Mt so that
wtNt =
Dt + (π − 1)Mt
Pt
. (9.35)
The profits of banks amount to




Profit maximization of producers implies





t − δ. (9.37b)
In the stationary equilibrium of the model we can drop all time indices from the above
equations. For further reference we define
r̃ := (1 + (1− τr)r) > 1. (9.38)
9.4.2 First order conditions
In the following we omit the index of the productivity type h as well as the index
of calendar time t and consider the problem faced by an agent of age s = 1 who is
born into a stationary environment. Lower case letters denote individual as opposed
to aggregate variables. ds and xs are the agent’s real bank deposits and real money
holdings, respectively. Both are measured in terms of the current period price level so
that πds+1 and πxs+1 are bank deposits and money holdings acquired at age s and put
aside for age s+ 1.




















(1− τw − θ)eszw + r̃ks
+tr + ΩB + xs+
ds(1− τr)(Q− 1)− cs










b̄+ r̃ks + tr
+ΩB + xs + ds+
ds(1− τr)(Q− 1)− cs

































where Γs and ξs denote the Lagrange multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint and
the non-negativity constraint on cash balances, respectively.












c−σs = λs + Γs
The first-order condition with respect to ks+1 implies
λs = βϕs+1λs+1r̃ (9.41)
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Setting to zero the derivatives the Lagrangean with respect to xs+1 and ds+1 delivers:
λs = (β/π)ϕs+1(λs+1 + Γs+1) + (1/π)ξs+1
λs = (β/π)ϕs+1λs+1 (1 + (Q− 1)(1− τr))
In addition, there are the slackness conditions of the cash-in-advance constraint,
0 ≤ Γs (9.42)
0 = Γs(xs + (1− τw − θ)eszw − cs), (9.43)
s = 1, ...R − 1 (9.44)
0 = Γs(xs + b− cs), (9.45)
s = R, . . . , T (9.46)
and of the non-negativity constraint on cash balances:
0 ≤ ξs+1.s = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 (9.47)
0 = ξs+1xs+1, s = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 (9.48)
Implications. Combining the first-order conditions gives
r̃ = (1 + (1− τr)r) = (1 + (Q− 1)(1− τr))/π. (9.49)
This condition implies that we are not able to solve for ds. Therefore, we define the
households interest bearing assets as
as := ks + ds/π.
This allows us to write the budget constraint as
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as+1 = (1− τw − θ)eszw + r̃as + ΩB (9.50)
+ tr + xs − πxs+1 − cs,
s = 1, . . . , R − 1
as+1 = b̄+ r̃as + Ω
B + tr
+ xs − πxs+1 − cs,
s = R, . . . T
Note that whenever the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind real cash balances
will be zero. To see this, assume xs+1 > 0 and cs+1 < (1 − τw − θ)es+1zwn so that
ξs+1 = Γs+1 = 0. This yields λs = (β/π)ϕs+1λs+1 from (??). Yet, since πr̃ > 1 this
contradicts condition (??).








denote aggregate interest bearing assets. Aggregate income from capital taxation is
given by
Tax = τrrK + τr(Q− 1)(D/P ) + τwwN (9.52)
where
K = A− (D/P )/π (9.53)
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Note, that we are not able to write the capital income taxes of this equation as a







ψsνh(ahs+1 + πxhs+1) (9.54)
Thus, aggregate transfers (which equal individual transfers tr since the total mass of
all living agents is normalized to unity) are derived from
tr = Tax+Beq −G (9.55)
9.4.4 Computational strategy
Suppose we have initial values for the aggregate stock of capital K0, the aggregate level
of real money balances (M/P )0, the aggregate level of bequests Beq0, the consumption
of generation s = 1, c1h, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m, as well as the Lagrange multiplier of the first-
year budget constraint λ1h, h = 1, 2, . . . ,m. We derive new values for these variables
in the following steps.
Step 1: Since N is only a function of given parameters, we are able to compute
Y = N1−αKα
G = gY
(where g = 0.195) as well as
• r via (??),
• Q via (9.19),
• w via (9.37a),
• D/P via (9.35),
• b̄h via the pension scheme (4.1).





h=1 ψsνhb̄h. Thus all variables that are exogenous to the indi-
vidual budget constraint are known.
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Step 2: We check the cash-in-advance constraint for generation s = 1: If c1h < (1−τw−
θ)eszhw, Γ1h = 0, else the cash-in-advance constraint applies: c1h−(1−τw−θ)eszhw = 0.
This delivers m conditions for our 2m+ 3 unknowns.
Step 3: We compute consumption, cash balances, and interest bearing assets for all
generations. Given λ1h we compute the sequence of Lagrange multipliers from (??).
For each s we first assume xsh > 0 (and, thus, that the cash-in-advance constraint








csh > (1− τw − θ)eszhw, s = 2, . . . , R − 1 (9.56)
csh > b̄h, s = R, . . . , T
we compute the cash balances of the s year old household from
xsh = csh − (1− τw − θ)eszhw, s = 2, . . . , R − 1
xsh = csh − b̄h, s = R, . . . , T







Given consumption and cash balances, we compute interest bearing assets from the
following equations:
For s = 2, . . . , R − 1,
ash = (1− τw − θ)es−1zhw + r̃as−1h + ΩB
+ tr + xs−1h − πxsh − cs−1h
and for s = R, . . . , T,
ash = b̄h + r̃as−1h + Ω
B
+ tr + xs−1h − πxsh − cs−1h
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The budget constraints of the T year old households imply m further conditions:
0 = b̄h + r̃aTh + Ω
B + tr + xTh − cTh.
Step 4: Finally, we compute the aggregate variables: Via (??) we compute aggregate
wealth and – since D/P = wN − (π − 1)(M/P )0 – we get K1 = A− (D/P )/π. From
(??) we get Beq1. Furthermore






Thus, we have these additional three equations:
0 = K1 −K0,
0 = (M/P )1 − (M/P )0,
0 = Beq1 −Beq0.
We solve this system with a non-linear equations solver using initial values on K, Beq,
c1h, and λ1h = c
−1/σ
1h from our baseline model without money.
To compute the agent’s gross income, for s = 1, . . . , R − 1,
yhs = (1− τw − θ)eszhw + r̃khs + (Q− 1)(1− τr)dhs + ΩB + tr
while for s = R, . . . , T,
yhs = b̄h + r̃khs + (Q− 1)(1− τr)dhs ++ΩB + tr
we assume dhs = (D/X)xhs for all s and h.
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